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RAOUL BERGERj and ABE KRASH*
No reform initiated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was more
enthusiastically acclaimed than its machinery for pre-trial discovery.' Dis-
covery was to abolish trial by ambush, to banish "the 'old fixed principle'
of keeping an opponent in the dark" and the "sporting theory of justice.
-" 2
Henceforth, the ends of justice were to be promoted by pretrial disclosure.3
No one has more eagerly resorted to the discovery machinery than the
Government;4 no one has been more grudging in making it reciprocally
available.' Viewed against traditional notions of fair play, it is not sur-
prising that Government attempts to "thwart the efforts of a plaintiff" to
obtain disclosure have been judicially labeled as "unseemly,"' as an "un-
just and tyrannical exercise of power."'  As former Attorney General
t Member of the District of Columbia and Illinois Bars.
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. This article deals with two of the pre-trial instruments of
discovery: the subpoena-deposition procedure under Rules 26 and 45, and discovery under
Rule 34.
Facts are also elicited and the issues narrowed before trial by admissions, interroga-
tories, and the pre-trial conference. On discovery in general see Holtzoff, Insrtments of
Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 Iscu. L. REv. 205 (1942) ; Pike
& Willis, Federal Discovery in Operation, 7 U. OF Cim. L. REv. 297 (1940); Sunderland,
Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. L. REv. 737 (1939).
For pre-Rules discovery see RAGLAND, DIScOVERY BEFORE TRTAL (1932); for
changes wrought by the Rules see 4 Mooies FEDERAL PRAcTicr 2428-33 (2d ed. 1950).
2. Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 997 (2d Cir. 1942); see also Hicknan v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
3. See Laverett v. Continental Briar Pipe Co., 25 F. Supp. C0, 83 (E.D. N.Y, 1938);
Laws, J., Pre-Trial Procedure, 1 F.R.D. 397, 399 (1940). It has been asserted that a failure
to disclose "prevented plaintiff from having a fair trial." Burton v. WVeyerhaeuser Timber
Co., I F.R.D. 571, 574 (D. Ore. 1941).
4. See, e.g., the sweeping discovery order sought by the Government in United States
v. National City Bank of New Yorl; 40 F. Supp. 99 (S.D. N.Y. 1941).
5. "In all these cases, particularly in those seeldng injunctive relief, the Government
expects the utmost cooperation of the defendants or even prospective defendants in placing
their files and records, ranging over periods of years, at the disposal of its agents. When
objection is encountered, the widest use is made of the processes of the courts. A justified
criticism of the Government is, however, that it is not so generous in reciprocating. Thus,
the Government stands on the liberal rules which allow them to plead the facts generally
and resist at all stages, every attempt to compel them, through bills of particulars, to sup-
ply data which would give the defendants a definite idea of the line of attack which they
may expect at the trial. Judges, in our Circuit, including myself, have been rather gen-
erous in compelling disclosure, so as to channel the inquiry." Yankwicb, Obserrations on
Anti-Trust Procedures, 10 F.R.D. 165, 168 (1950). (Emphasis supplied throughout).
The cases compelling the Government to disclose, hereinafter cited, illustrate that a
battle has been required at every step.
6. Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D. N.Y., 1949).
7. United States v. General Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D. 528, 530 (N.D. IlL, 1942).
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Mitchell said, "it ought not to be necessary to resort to discovery against
the government," for "the government litigates with its citizens and ought
to be frank and fair and disclose all the facts."'
The mounting volume of litigation in which the Government is in-
volved, coupled with the increasing tendency to suppress information under
the guise of national security,9 presents a problem of growing importance
in the relationship between state and citizen. When the Government is
confronted by some industrial giant, there is relative equality in such liti-
gation. But too often, it is the little man who is overwhelmed by the Gov-
ernment's vast resources. For example, seizures of American property by
the Alien Property Custodian on the alleged ground that it is enemy-owned
pauperize the claimant at the outset,' ° so that he is unable to duplicate the
extensive trial preparation undertaken by the Government. Similarly, in-
justice may be done to litigants of small means prosecuting claims under
the Federal Tort Claims and Suits in Admiralty Acts if the Government
withholds the written statements of witnesses to the accident." Govern-
ment consent to suit in such cases may become meaningless if linked with
a right to suppress facts in its possession. 2
These problems have received surprisingly little critical attention, and
were left dangling in air this year by the Supreme Court in its little-noticed
8. Remarks as Chairman of the Advisory Committee to the Supreme Court on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, at PROCEEDINGS OF THE INST. OF THE AM. BAR Ass'N,,
F.R.C.P., WAsH., N.Y. 333-334 (1938). The rule governing criminal prosecutions might
well be given wider scope: "The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in a public prosecution
is not to convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts . .. capable of
establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible." American Bar Asrsocia-
tion Canons of Ethics, Canon No. 5. See also Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190, 207
(U.S. 1850) (Government committed to a higher degree of fairness than a private litigant).
9. Few cases actually involve military or diplomatic secrets; normally litigants seek
written statements secured by the government from third parties which would be or-
dered produced forthwith if held by a private individual. Ordinarily military or diplo-
matic secrets are privileged. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2378A (3d ed. 1940).
The sharply debated disclosure problem in loyalty proceedings involves a question
different from that under discussion. In such cases the documents are in the possession of
those who judge, but are withheld from the defendant. The question here considered is
whether the federal government can withhold from federal judges the power to inspect
relevant documents and to decide if they should be divulged to litigants.
10. Cf. McGrath v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 338 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
11. Of the twenty-seven civil cases reported as of September, 1950, in which discov-
ery was sought against the federal government, eight involved negligence claims. There
were five antitrust cases, three Fair Labor Standards Act proceedings, three war risk
insurance cases, and one case each involving price control, Food and Drug Act, Inter-
state Commerce Act, alien property, patent infringement, taxation, and an informer's action.
12. The government's consent to suit, Judge Rifkind has declared, ". . . amounts to
an endorsement of the [action] with the sovereign's command 'Soit droit fait al partied.
[Let right be done to the party.] But right cannot be done if the government is allowed to
suppress the facts in its possession." Bank Line v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 801, 804
(S.D. N.Y., 1948).
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per curiam decision in Uited States v. Cotton Valley Oil Operators Com-
mittee. 3 Defendants were charged with violating the Sherman Act.
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation examined defendants' files
and interviewed officers and employees of the defendants as well as other
persons. The defendants thereupon moved for discovery under Rule 34
to require the Attorney General to produce all FBI reports, and all com-
munications and replies thereto received by the Department of Justice re-
lating to the challenged activities of the defendants. 4
In opposing the motion, the Government maintained that it was "ex-
clusively within the authority of the Attorney General to determine
whether such documents" were privileged.'5 The trial judge directed the
Government to submit the documents to the court for its determination as
to which, if any, were privileged and which should be supplied defendants.
When the Government refused to comply with this ruling, the complaint
was dismissed."" The Supreme Court, equally divided, affirmed the deci-
sion per curiam.
The failure of the Court to reach any decision in the Cotton Valley case
leaves the door open for continuing controversy over the scope of the Gov-
ernment's privilege. The contention that a Government agency may decide
for itself what documents it will divulge to the court is tantamount to a
claim of blanket immunity from discovery procedure. If the court is not
permitted to pass on a claim of privilege, "discovery" against the Govern-
ment comes to mean that those facts will be disclosed which the Govern-
ment wishes to disclose. To all litigants in need of facts in the Govern-
ment's possession this problem is acute. It is our purpose to examine the
basic considerations which furnish a guide to judgment on this and related
issues.
THE GOVERNMENT AS A LITIGANT
Discovery may be sought in civil cases to which the Government is a
party, in civil actions to which the Government is a stranger, and in crimi-
nal prosecutions. In the criminal cases, the courts, lacking the discovery
provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure, have drawn upon principles
analogous to waiver.-" It was soon perceived that this was but a "useful
fiction." The Government "waives" nothing by bringing a criminal prose-
13. 339U.S.940 (1950).
14. Brief for the United States, Statement as to Jurisdiction, pp. 3-4, United States v.
Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 339 U.S. 940 (1950).
15. Id. at 4-5.
16. United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 9 F.ILD. 719 (V.D. La.
1949).
17. "The government must choose; either it must leave the transactions in the obscurity
from which a trial may draw them, or it must ex-pose them." United States v. Andolschek,
142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944). See also United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 870
(2d Cir. 1948) ; United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir. 1946) ; United States
v. Krulewitch, 145 F2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1944).
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cution to enforce its laws. But the fiction supplied a convenient rationaliza-
tion for an underlying policy: no one should be convicted of a crime with-
out having access to material which might exculpate him."8
Principles of waiver had earlier been applied in civil actions where the
Government was plaintiff,'" and were subsequently applied to the Govern-
ment as defendant in Bank Line v. United States." Balancing the public
interest in assuring justice to litigants against the Government's interest
in preserving the secrecy of its housekeeping records, the court inched be-
yond the criminal and civil-plaintiff cases. Whatever the force of "waiver"
when the Government sued or prosecuted, it plainly waived nothing when
made a defendant. A different rationalization was therefore necessary.
Sovereign immunity would normally prevent suits against the Govern-
ment. In consenting to suit, Congress could have circumscribed consent
by immunity against disclosure. But since no limitations had been at-
tached to the consent, the court was free to assume that no limitations were
intended.
The court, however, was apparently unaware that the Congress had
moved beyond such implications and made the Government subject to
discovery requirements. For the Rules were intended to and do apply
equally to the Government and private litigants.-' Statements of the
18. See United States v. Watkins, 67 F. Supp. 556, 561 (S.D. N.Y. 1946).
19. A Government officer who sues "must be held to have waived any privilege which
he might otherwise have had, to withhold testimony.... [He] must either give up his privi-
lege to withhold pertinent evidence or he must abandon his suit." Fleming v. Bernardi,
1 F.R.D. 624, 625 (N.D. Ohio 1941); and see Bowles v. Ackerman, 4 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.
N.Y. 1945). Other cases in which discovery was granted where Government was plaintiff:
United States v. New York, C. & St.L. Ry., 8 F.R.D. 258 (N.D. Ohio 1948); Walling v.
Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 4 F.R.D. 265 (E.D. N.Y. 1943); United States v. General
Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D. 528 (N.D. Ill. 1942).
20. 76 F. Supp. 801, 804 (S.D. N.Y. 1948). Other cases in which discovery was granted
where Government was defendant: Brauner v. United States, 19 U.S.L. WEEK 2036
(D.C. Pa. 1950); Henz v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 291 (N.D. Cal. 1949); Cresmer v.
United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D. N.Y. 1949); Societe Internationale Pour Participations
Industrielles et Commerciales, S. A. v. Clark, 9 F.R.D. 263 (D.C. D.C. 1949); O'Neill v.
United States, 79 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1948); Wunderly v. United States, 8 F.R.D. 356
(E.D. Pa. 1948); Cogdill v. T.V.A., 7 F.R.D. 411 (E.D. Tenn. 1947); Brewer v. Hassett,
2 F.R.D. 222 (D. Mass. 1942); United States v. Smith, 117 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1941);
Galanos v. United States, 27 F. Snpp. 298 (D. Mass. 1939).
21. "Rules 1 and 81 carefully provide that they shall apply to all suits of a civil nature,
whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity, except those specifically excepted; and
the character of the proceedings which it was thought necessary to except by express state-
ment in Rule 81, as well as the language of these rules, shows that the new 'Civil action'
includes actions against the United States." Sherwood v. United States, 112 F.2d 587,
590 (2d Cir. 1940).
"To hold that the rules do not apply to the United States except where it is particularly
mentioned would lead to absurd results." United States v. General Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D.
528, 530 (N.D. Ill. 1942).
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draftsmen contemporaneous with its adoption, - - the structure of the
Rules,23 and the decisions, 24 have conclusively established that the Govern-
ment is to be treated no differently than a private litigant 25 and is bound
by every provision of the Rules except where expressly exempted. ' The
exemption granted from some of the rules is notably absent in the discov-
ery provisions. It is faulty analysis to pose the problem in terms of
whether the Rules enlarged the consent to be sued. T  Analysis must begin
with the fact that such consent places the Government in the position of an
ordinary litigant except to the extent that it is expressly exempted from
the Rules. And once there is consent the provision granting that consent
should be construed to accomplish its purpose.28
In the Cotton Valley and other recent cases the Government has claimed
the right to determine for itself, without judicial interference, what docu-
ments in its possession are privileged so as to be exempt from discovery.
The basis of the claim is threefold: a reading of Marbury v. Madison and
the Trial of Aaron Burr; a construction of Section 22 of Title 5 of the
United States Code; and an alleged necessity for secrecy plus a faith in
22. At the American Bar Association Institute on the Federal Rules, Charles E. Clar,
reporter for the Advisory Committee, declared that "... . it was our theory that except as
we made special provisions these rules apply to the United States as a litigant as much
as to anyone else." PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE OF THE AIL BAI Ass'N., F.R.C.P.,
WASH., N.Y. 50 (1938).
Former Attorney General William D. Mitchell said that "... these rules put the
government on the same basis as any other litigant land] in the absence of any provision
exempting the government from these rules they apply."
Mitchell then noted that Rule 33 which is drawn in the same general terms as the dis-
covery provision, Rule 34, is applicable to the United States. Id. at 333.
And Prof. Dawson added: "Rule 34 provides for the discovery and production of doc-
umenrts and things for inspections. I should say that it does apply to the United States
subject to the usual limitations for privileged or confidential documents.' Id. at 105.
23. There are nine sections in the rules according special treatment to the United
States-Rules 4(4); 12(a); 25 (d); 37(f); 39(c); 54(d); 55(e); 62(e); 65(c). These ex-
ceptions would be superfluous if the unqualified provisions did not apply.
24. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 341 (1949) holding that "[i]t
ought to be unnecessary to say that Rule 52 [which provides that findings of fact shall not
be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous] applies to appeals by the government as
well as to those by other litigants. There is no exception which permits it . .. to come
to this court ... for a trial de novo." Cf. United States v. General Motors Corp., 2
F.R.D7528, 530 (N.D. IlL 1942): "If Rule 33 is not applicable to the United States ...
it would have been expressly stated that the United States was not subject to Rule 33:'
25. See Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 4 F.R.D. 265 (E.D. N.Y. 1943).
26. Like every litigant, the government may of course invoke an applicable privilege.
Rule 26(b) provides that "the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not Privi-
leged." Rule 34 states that any party may be ordered "to produce ... any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not
privileged."
27. See O'Reilly, Discovery Against the United States: A New Aspect of Sovereign
Iinmunity? 21 N.C.L. REv. 1, 3-5 (1942).
28. Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242,245 (1940).
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administrative expertise to determine what may properly be divulged. The
three parts of this argument may be examined separately.
The Historical Claim of Executive Immunity
The Attorney General maintains that, "personifying the executive
branch of the Government, [he] is free to refuse disclosure of any evi-
dence in his possession, regardless of its character, for any reason which
may seem to him sufficient."29 This contention departs from the position
earlier taken by the Attorney General,8" and it reaches deep into our history
for its foundation. In the Cotton Valley case, the Government rested its
claim on a colloquy in Marbury v. Madison,"1 and dn the fact that in the
Burr case President Jefferson "ignored the subpoena and directed the
United States Attorney to produce only such portions of the letter as he
deemed not to be confidential."32
Neither half of the argument will bear analysis. The Marbury colloquy,
repeatedly pressed on Chief Justice Marshall during the Burr trial, 8 was
rejected by him on the ground that it concerned only communications be-
tween the President and his Secretary of State,84 which were in fact "con-
fidential." Thus Marshall confined the colloquy to "confidential" executive
communications.
Further, it is hardly accurate to state that "Jefferson ignored the sub-
poena" which issued in the Burr case. Chief Justice Marshall issued a
subpoena commanding President Jefferson to appear and to bring cer-
29. O'Neill v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 827, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1948). This is spelled
out in the Government's Cotton Valley brief, supra note 14, at 5-8.
30. Mr. Justice Clark, then Attorney General, stated in 1947: "It is important that there
should be no appearance of arbitrary refusal to comply with the subpoena [to produce
documents] and that every respect should be paid to the court's order. Therefore, tile offi-
cer or employee should, unless directed to the contrary by the Attorney General, bring
with him the records and documents which are called for by the subpoena even though tile
Department takes the position that it is not necessary to produce them .... If questioned
the officer or employee should state [to the court] that the material is at hand and can be
submitted to the court for determination as to its materiality in the case and whether in
the best public interests the information should be disclosed." Dept. Justice Order No.
3229, Supp. No. 2, June 6, 1947.
31. 1 Cranch 137, 144-145 (U.S. 1803): "The court said that if Mr. Lincoln [Attorney
General] wished time to consider the answers he should make, they would give him time;
but they had no doubt he ought to answer. There was nothing confidential required to be
disclosed. If there had been he was not obliged to answer it; and if he thought that any
thing was communicated to him in confidence he was not bound to disclose it; nor was
he obliged to state any thing which would criminate himself; but that the fact whether
such commissions had been in the office or not, could not be a confidential fact; it is a fact
which all the world have a right to know. If he thought any of the questions improper,
he inight state his objections."
32. Brief, supra note 14, at 5-6.
33. Aaron Burr's Trial, I ROBERTSON's RfP. 117 (1875); II RoBERrson's RErr. 521,
524, 526 (Phila. 1808).
34. II ROBERTsoN's REPT. 527 (1808).
[Vol. 59: 14511456
1950] GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY FROM DISCOVERY
tain letters, documents, and copies of orders and instructions given by him
to the armed services respecting Aaron Burr. The power to subpoena the
President was conceded; Government counsel William Wirt merely ar-
gued that the documents sought were not relevant and that a subpoena
duces tecum was addressed to the discretion of the court.as Marshall took
the legality of the subpoena for granted. A subpoena duccs tecum could
issue, he said, "to any person to whom an ordinary subpoena may issue,
directing him to bring any paper of which the party praying it has a right
to avail himself as testimony.""0 This was compulsory production of doc-
uments by the Government, which lies at the root of the discovery as well
as the subpoena power.
It is true that Jefferson asserted the power to withhold,'- but nonethe-
less he fully complied with the subpoena.3" He produced all the documents
demanded except one, a letter from General Wilkinson, and he left it to
Government Counsel, George Hay, to withhold "communication of any
parts of the [Wilkinson] letter which are not dircctly material for the pur-
poses of justice. '3 Hay emphasized that he was willing to disclose the
entire letter to the court, and leave it to the court to suppress so much of the
letter as was not material to the case.40 This was re-emphasized in his re-
35. I ROBERTSON'S REPT. 121 (1875).
36. Id. at 178. As to the court's "discretion," Marshall said that "(T]he court has no
right to refuse its aid to motions for papers to which the accused may be entitled, and
which may be material in his defense." Id. at 180. Lest it be thought the rule in civil
cases may be narrower, note 'Marshall's statement: "If this might be likened to a civil case,
the law is express on the subject. It is that either party may require the other to pro-
duce books or writings in their possession or power, which contain evidence pertinent to
the issue" II ROBERTSON'S REPT. 534 (1808).
37. The Jefferson correspondence concerning the subpoena is collected in 9 FoRD,
WRITINGS OF THomAs JEFFERSON 55-62 (1892-99).
38. Jefferson, on June 12, 1807, wrote George Hay, the United States District Attorney,
that he had delivered the papers to the Attorney General, and instructed the War and
Navy Departments to review their files with a view to compliance. I Rommrso.'s REP?.
211 (1875). On June 17, 1807, Jefferson wrote Hay that "[t]he receipt of these papers
[by Hay] has I presume, so far anticipated, and others this day forwarded will have
substantially fulfilled the object of a subpoena from the District Court of Richmond. ;.
Id. at 265.
When Jefferson learned that the Attorney General did not have the Wilkinson letter
subpoenaed by Burr, he wrote Hay on June 23, 1807: "No researches shall be spared to
recover this letter and if recovered it shall immediately be sent on to you." 9 Forn,
WRITINGS OF THomAs JEFFERSON 61 (1892-99). Hay advised the court that "When we
receive General Wilkinson's letter, the return will be complete." I ROBERTSON.'S Rnvr. 267
(1875).
39. I RBEaTSoN'S REPT. 211 (1875).
40. Thus Hay said: "The application made by the defendant is that testimony which
concerns himself should be adduced; that what tends to his own just dfelnse and exculpa-
tion may be brought forward. Is it right that he should have moref Is it proper, fair or
right that he should have the liberty of going through the whole letter, as well those parts
which do not relate to him as those which do, for the purpose of making unfavorable im-
pressions on the public mind, . . . making public confidential communications respecting
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turn to the subpoena duces tecum wherein he returned a copy of the letter
"excepting such parts thereof as are, in my opinion, not material for
the purposes of justice, for the defence of the accused, or pertinent to
the issue now about to be joined. . . .The accuracy of this opinion
I am willing to refer to the judgment of the court, by submitting the
original letter to its inspection."
'41
Far from asserting a claim of absolute privilege, therefore, the Govern-
ment was perfectly willing to leave it to the court to determine whether
portions of the letter were in fact privileged. It insisted only that the por-
tions so adjudged should be withheld from the defendant. To this the de-
fendant objected that the court could not judge whether the confidential
portions were relevant to the defense until that defense was fully disclosed,
and that defendants were not required to make such disclosure until they
had put in their case. 2
It was on this state of facts that Chief Justice Marshall ruled. He said
"That the president of the United States may be subpoenaed, and
examined as a witness, and required to produce any paper in his pos-
session, is not controverted. . . .The president, although subject to
the general rules which apply to others, may have sufficient motives
for declining to produce a particular paper, and those motives inay be
such as to restrain the court from enforcing its production. . . . I
can readily conceive that the president might receive a letter which it
would be improper to exhibit in public, because of the manifest in-
convenience of its exposure. The occasion for demanding it ought, in
such a case, to be very strong, and to be fully shown to the court before
its production could be insisted on."
43
And, referring to private letters sent to the President respecting matter of
public concern, Marshall stated that they
"ought not on light ground to be forced into public view. Yet it is
a very serious thing, if such letter should contain any information ma-
terial to the defence, to withhold from the accused the power of mak-
ing use of it. . . .I cannot precisely lay down any general rule for
such a case. Perhaps the court ought to consider the reasons, which
would induce the president to refuse to exhibit such letter as con-
clusive on it, unless such letter could be shown to be absolutely neces-
sary in the defence. The president may himself state the particular
reasons which may have induced him to withhold a paper, and the
court would unquestionably allow full force to those reasons. At the
private characters, and thereby producing controversies and violent quarrels. I wish the
court to look at the letter and see whether it do not contain what ought not to be submit-
ted to public inspection." II ROBERTSON'S REPT. 509 (1808).
41. Id. at 513-514.
42. Id. at 516.
43. Id. at 535-536. Emphasis supplied.
[Vol. 59: 14511458
GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY FROM DISCOVERY
same time the court could not refuse to pay proper attcn tion to the
affidavit of the accused. But on objections being made by the presi-
dent to the production of a paper, the court would not proceed further
in the cause without siuch an affidavit as would clearly show the paper
to be essential to the justice of the case ... [T]o induce the court
to take any definitive and decisive step with respect to the prosecution,
founded on the refusal of the president to exhibit a paper, for reasons
stated by himself, the materiality of that paper ought to be shown.""
And he finally stated that
"I do not think that the accused ought to be prohibited from seeing
the letter .... ,,45
Such is the historical background of the Government's argument for
immunity from discovery procedure. The subpoena to Jefferson was not
"ignored," nor was discretion as to disclosure left in the hands of the ex-
ecutive. Instead of supporting the Government's contentions, the Burr
case shows that Marshall forthrightly asserted and exercised the judiciary's
power to decide whether the executive claim of privilege was meritorious
and decided in the case before him that the claim had no merit.40
Ultimately the claim of executive immunity from discovery rests on the
separation of powers. Pressed to its logical conclusion that argument
would immunize executive agencies from suits altogether. Yet it is un-
debatable that Congress may authorize suits against executive agencies,
the separation of powers notwithstanding.47 Given the power to bring
administrators into court by summons, the lesser power to subpoena or to
compel them to produce documents logically follows. That the United
44. Id at 536. Emphasis supplied.
45. Id. at 537. Earlier in the trial Marshall ruled "That there may be matter, the
production of which the court would not require is certain; but that, in a capital case, the
accused ought, in some form, to have the benefit of it, if it were really essen3tial to his
defense, is a position which the court would very reluctantly deny.. .. There is certainly
nothing before this court which shows that the letter in question contains any matter the
disclosure of which would endanger the public safety.
"If it does contain any matter which it would be imprudent to disclose, which it is not
the wish of the Executive to disclose, such matter, if it be not iminmediately and essentially
applicable to the point, will of course be suppressed. ... Everything of this knd, how-
ever, will have its due consideration on the return of the subpoena." I Ronnmtsor's REPT.
183-184 (1875).
46. The claim of "executive" immunity is but a variant of "soveregn" immunity,
which is in "current disfavor." RFC v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81 (1941) ; Federal
Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 (1940); Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 305
U.S. 381 (1939).
47. "[N]o suit can be maintained against the United States ... without express
authority of Congress.... Neither the Secretary of War nor the Attorney General nor
any subordinate of either has been authorized to waive the exemption of the United
States from judicial process, or to submit the United States [to suit]: ' Stanley v.
Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255, 270 (1896); United States v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 436, 444 (U.S. 1834).
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States enjoys no immunity as plaintiff which is denied to it as defendant
seems clear, particularly since Congress has undoubted power to prescribe
how litigants must proceed. No one, as Marbury v. Madison demon-
strates, was more sensitive to the separation of powers than Marshall;
his omission to mention that problem in the Burr opinions strongly mili-
tates against an argument that separation of powers demands executive
immunity.
The Claim of Statutory Immunity
The Government has also repeatedly claimed a statutory immunity from
the discovery rules by virtue of Section 22 of Title 5 of the United States
Code;" and it argued in the Cotton Valley case that Section 22 constituted
Congressional recognition of the executive privilege.49 Section 22 reads as
follows:
"The head of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations,
not inconsistent with law, for the government of his department, the
conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and performance of
its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records,
papers, and property appertaining to it."50  (Emphasis supplied).
The government's contention that this section authorizes federal agencies
to claim immunity from discovery ignores the emphasized phrase. If regu-
lations promulgated under Section 22 cannot be "inconsistent with law,"
they cannot be "inconsistent with" the Rules, which have the force of law.51
The discovery rules do not exempt the United States. The authority to
prescribe regulations "not inconsistent with law" therefore does not confer
48. United States v. Kohler, 9 F.R.D. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1949); O'Neill v. United States,
79 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1948) ; Wunderly v. United States, 8 F.R.D. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1948) ;
Zimmerman v. Poindexter, 74 F. Supp. 933 (Hawaii 1947) ; United States v. Schine Chain
Theatres, 4 F.R.D. 108 (W.D. N.Y. 1944); Walling v. Comet Carriers, 3 F.R.D. 442
(S.D. N.Y. 1944).
49. Brief, supra note 14, at 6. For a discussion of the relation of Section 22 to the
discovery rule, see Note, 58 YALE L.J. 993 (1949).
50. 5 U.S.C. § 22 was created by the revisers of the federal statutes in 1875 by com-
bining two groups of acts. One group, dating from 1789, authorized the heads of newly
established agencies of the government "to have the custody and charge of all records,
books, and papers" pertaining to their official duties then in the possession of others. See,
e.g., 1 STAT. 28 (1789). Another series had authorized department heads to "make all
necessary rules and regulations for the government and management of their agencies."
See, e.g., 16 STAT. 163 (1870). It is this blend of "housekeeping" statutes which the At-
torney General cites as the statutory source of his exclusive authority to withhold docu-
ments relevant to litigation.
51. Beasley v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 518, 527 (E.D. S.C. 1948); C. J. Wieland
& Son Dairy Products Co. v. Wickard, 4 F.R.D. 250, 252 (E.D. Wis. 1945); United
States v. Schine Chain Theatres, 2 F.R.D. 425, 427 (W.D. N.Y. 1942).
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an administrative power to carve out an exemption from rules having the
force of law any more than from the coverage of any other statute, 2
Furthermore, under a familiar doctrine of statutory construction, Con-
gressional approval 3 of the Rules exhibits an intention to withhold govern-
mental immunity from discovery. The exemption expressly granted the
United States from certain of the Rules was withheld in the discovery pro-
visions. The pattern of express exemption thus established precludes the
possibility of implied exemptions elsewhere. The omission of an express
exemption in the discovery rules must therefore be considered a studied
omission which would be made futile if Section 22 were interpreted as con-
ferring an exemption. 4 Lacking express provision for absolute executive
privilege, the Rules are equivalent to a Congressional adoption of Mar-
shall's view that there is none.
As the Government has recognized, most courts follow this interpreta-
tion, and insist on their right to determine the scope of the Government
52. A departmental non-disclosure regulation must yield to a parallel Admiralty Rule.
O'Neill v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 827, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1948); and see Brauner v.
United States, 19 U.S.L. WEEK 2036 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
It was likewise held in United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, 4 F.R.D. 103, 109
(W.D. N.Y. 1944) that the non-disclosure regulation of the Department of Justice . ..
does not prevent the court from ordering the production of files of the Department of Jus-
tice in all cases. There may be certain of such files which are entirely privileged and
others which are not" See also Zimmerman v. Poindeter, 74 F. Supp. 933, 935 (Havwaii
1947) ("the clear mandate that all executive regulations be 'not inconsistent with law' cir-
cumscribes the power of the entity prescribing the regulation under consideration, and
operates to make the applicability and enforceability of a specific department regulation a
judicial question for ultimate decision by the court!").
Cases to the contrary such as Walling v. Comet Carriers Inc., 3 F.R.D. 442 (S.D.
N.Y. 1944), and United States v. Brooks, 51 F. Supp. 974 (D. N.J. 1943), overlook the
paramount force of the Rules with respect to any regulation promulgated under 5 U.S.C.
§22 (1948).
The O'Neill case was distinguished on the ground that the Government was acting
in a "proprietary" as differentiated from a "sovereign" capacity in United States v. Kohler
Co., 9 F.R.D. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1949). The Rules recognize no such distinction. It is more-
over an "artificial distinction' which should not be extended. Cf. Pike & Fischer, Discoz-
ery Agaihst Federal Administrative Agencies, 56 HAnv. L. R-v. 1125, 1129 (1943).
53. The approval is traced in United States v. Brandt, 8 F.R.D. 163, 165 (D. Mont.
1948).
54. That the power to make regulations "not inconsistent with law" does not stretch
to creation of an absolute privilege may be further deduced from the quite different statutes
which do in fact unequivocally confer such a privilege. Compare, for example, the absolute
privilege accorded to income tax records. 26 U.S.C. § 55 (1940). See also the rule i.th re-
spect to practice in the Court of Claims that "the head of any department may refuse and
omit to comply with any call for information or papers, when, it ds opinion, such compli-
ance will be injurious to the public interest" 28 U.S.C. § 2507 (1948). No such discretion
is conferred by § 22-the difference is too striking to be ignored. The attempt to read the
"policy" of this rule into 5 U.S.C. § 22, as in Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp.
583, 585 (E.D. N.Y. 1939), would judicially amend § 22, and confer a discretion there %ith-
held.
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privilege."' The reasons for this stand, were expressed by Judge Augustus
Hand in terms of policy, without noticing Marshall's early rejection of
executive self-determination of the scope of its privilege:
"It has been the policy of the American as well as of the English courts
to treat the government when appearing as a litigant like any private
individual. Any other practice would strike at the personal responsi-
bility of governmental agencies, which is at the base of our institutions.
The existence of governmental privileges mnust be established by the
party invoking them and the right of government officers to prevent
disclosure of state secrets must be asserted in the sane way procedur-
ally as that of a private individual."50
Considerations of Policy
Implicit in the Government's analysis is the premise that administrators
are more qualified by virtue of their expertise to judge whether publica-
tion of a particular document would be detrimental to the public interest. 7
55. For this Government brief cited United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir.
1944) ; United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1942) ; United States v. Beckman,
155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946) ; United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1948); United
States v. Coplon (D.C. D.C., Criminal No. 381-49, 1949); United States ex rel. Touhy v.
Ragen, 180 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1950). Brief, supra note 14, at 7-8, n. 2. See also cases
cited, notes 21 and 22 supra.
The Government cited the following cases where the privilege had been "honored":
Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co. v. United States, 175 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1949); Ex parte Sackett,
74 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1935); United States v. Kohler Co., 9 F.R.D. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
In the Pacific-Atlantic case the Court affirmed a denial of a motion to produce records of a
Navy Court trial without assigning any reason. The Sackett case, which antedates the
Rules, involved a private litigation and turned on the force of a departmental regulation
which was not "inconsistent with law." The Kohler case turned on the common law
privilege for informers. Similar cases are United States v. Deere & Co., 9 F.R.D. 523
(D. Minn. 1949) ; United States v. Sun Oil Co., 19 U.S.L. WE=m 2090 (Pa., 1950). The
Government's broad claim of privilege was recognized in Walling v. Comet Carriers, 3
F.R.D. 442 (S.D. N.Y. 1944), and United States v. Brooks, 51 F. Supp. 974 (D. N.J. 1943).
Cf. Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. N.Y. 1939).
56. Bank Line v. United States, 163 F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1947) (emphasis supplied).
See also Jones v. Watts, 142 F.2d 575, 577 (5th Cir. 1944) ; United States v. Alexander, 47
F. Supp. 900, 907 (W.D. Va. 1942) ; Henz v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 291, 294 (N.D. Cal.
1949).
Under the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, A.L.I. (1942), the power is likewise reserved to
the courts. Rule 227 provides that a "witness has a privilege to refuse to disclose a matter
on the ground that it is a secret of state . . . unless the judge finds that the matter is not a
secret of state.' Cf. Model Code Rule 228.
57. Lord Dunedin summarized this argument when he stated that whether "the publi-
cation of a document is or is not detrimental to the public service depends so much upon the
various points of view from which it may be regarded, and I do not think the court is in
possession of these various points of view." Lord's Comm'rs of the Admiralty v. Aberdeen
Steam Trawling & Fishing Co., Ltd. [1909] S.C. 335, 340-41. Lord Chancellor Simon has
said, in holding conclusive an administrator's judgment not to disclose, that preliminary
judicial inspection would violate the rule against reading a communication which is with-
held from the other party. Duncan v. Camell Laird [1942] A.C. 624. But in discovery
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This assumes that it is impossible to brief the court adequately on such mat-
ters-a dubious assumption. The problems involved do not transcend the
vast range of complexities which are constantly submitted to the courts.
Patent cases, for example, illustrate the frequent judicial determination of
technical issues of great moment.
More serious than the possibility of over-complexity is the consideration
that the national security will be threatened if federal agencies are not free
to withhold information altogether. The assumption here is that protec-
tion of government secrets cannot safely be entrusted to the judiciary-
that a judge will be less zealous than an administrative officer in preserv-
ing official secrets. That assumption is at war with the unique respect the
judiciary enjoys. Then too, private industry has often been compelled to
disclose secret processes and the like and to rely for protection on the court's
discretion." Disclosure to the courts does not spell widespread disclosure;
if the documents are privileged-as are official secrets-they will be with-
held by the courts from private litigants and the general publicYr'9
To insist that the Government disclose relevant documents to the court
is not to disparage administrative expertise. Normally only preliminary
jurisdiction and not finality is claimed for administrators, and this in a
case where the agency is an arbiter without a stake in the outcome. If an
administrative agency could be relied upon to weigh wisely and impartially
the total public interest against its own convenience c° it might then be
cases the excluded party welcomes ex parte communication in preference to the opponent's
exclusive power to decide.
58. See E. I. duPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 103 (1917), a
suit to enjoin disclosure of trade secrets, where Justice Holmes pointed out that "the
judge who tries the case will know the secrets, and if... in the opinion of the trial judge,
it is or should become necessary to reveal the secrets to others, it vill rest in the judge's
discretion to determine whether, to whom, and under what precautions the revelation should
be made." Cf. John T. Lloyd Laboratories, Inc. v. Lloyd Bros. Pharmacists, 131 F.2d 703,
707 (6th Cir. 1942) ; 1 CALLUANN, UNFA~m CorEwrrrioN AND TnoADE MArrs 714 (1945).
59. In approving the trial court's dismissal of the cause for non-compliance with the
production order in United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee, notes 14 and 16
supra, Professor Moore has stated that "the court adopted a course of action that fairly
safeguarded any legitimate interest the government as litigant had in maintaining the
secrecy of the documents-the government documents were first to be submitted to the
court, and if it sustained the government's claim the defendants would not have had access
to the documents and the information." 4 MooRE's FEMaL PRAcrics 1178 (2d ed. 1950).
60. "I do not think that it is out of place to indicate the sort of grounds which would
not afford to the Minister adequate justification for objecting to production. It is not a
sufficient ground that the documents are 'State documents' or 'official' or are marked 'con-
fidential.' It would not be a good ground that if they were produced the consequences might
involve the department of the government in parliamentary discussion or in public criticism,
or might necessitate the attendance as witnesses or otherwise of officials who have pressing
duties elsewhere. Neither would it be a good ground that production might tend to expose
a want of efficiency in the administration or tend to lay a department open to claims for
compensation. In a word it is not enough that the department does not want to have the
document produced. The minister in deciding whether it is his duty to object should bear
these considerations in mind, for he ought not to take the responsibility of withholding
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supererogatory to insist on judicial review. But one must consider the
matter in the framework of administrative realities. The diffusion of
power in great agencies often lodges actual responsibility in the fourth or
fifth tier of the administrative hierarchy. A subordinate immediately con-
cerned with a case may not bring to it the fine objectivity of a Stimson.
And the lawyers who litigate the case for the department not infrequently
are as set on winning at all costs as counsel for a private litigant. To
make the "head" of a department the ultimate arbiter of disclosure is, un-
der the circumstances, no guarantee that the determination will be founded
upon sound principles of national interest." Nor does the record of un-
flagging departmental opposition to disclosure on any and all grounds con-
duce to confidence in administrative impartiality on this score.
Entrust the administrators with exclusive power to determine which
facts shall be divulged, said Wigmore, and the gate to unlimited ex-
tension of the privilege categories is open. 2 Such extension not only con-
flicts with the Supreme Court's admonition that a privilege "should be re-
stricted to its narrowest bounds",0 but it violates the more fundamental
axiom that no party should ever be permitted to be judge in his own cause.
THE GOVERNMENT AS A THIRD PARTY
The power to withhold governmental records in private litigation was
given early judicial recognition in Boske v. Com gore.04 The State of
production except in cases where the public interest would otherwise be damnified-e.g.,
where the disclosure would be injurious to national defence, or to good diplomatic relations,
or where the practice of keeping a class of documents secret is necessary for the proper
functioning of the public service." Lord Chancellor Simon, in Duncan v. Camell Laird
[1942] A.C. 624, 642.
61. In cases involving Atomic Energy secrets it has been suggested that a Commis-
sioner submit to the court an affidavit assigning reasons for non-disclosure. Haydock,
Some Evidentiary Problems Posed by Atomic Energy Security Requirements, 61 HARV. L.
REv. 468, 477 (1948). But this does not obviate the objection that "interested" subordinates
-vill in fact make the decision. Perhaps Atomic Energy secrets are anyway in a separate
-category by virtue of the provision that the Commission shall "control the dissemination of
restricted data in such a manner as to assure the common defense and security." 42
U.S.C.A. Supp. § 1810 (1946).
See rejection of privilege claim for investigation by Navy Board of Inquiry, Cresmer
v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D. N.Y. 1949); but see Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co.,
26 F. Supp. 583, 585 (E.D. N.Y. 1939).
62. 8 WIGUORE, EVIDENCE § 2379 (3d ed. 1940).
63. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 506 (1947). In considering any extension of the
privilege categories, it is well to bear in mind the words of Professor Morgan: "So serious
an interference with rational inquiry can be justified only by accompanying social benefits
-of high worth. . . .If a privilege to suppress the truth is to be recognized at all, its limits
should be sharply determined so as to coincide with the limits of benefits it creates. In
many decisions this principle is disregarded. Sentiment serves for judgment, and rhetoric
is substituted for reason." Foreword, A.L.I. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE 7 (1942).
64. 177 U.S. 459 (1900). The rule is now considered well settled. See United States
v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944).
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Kentucky had filed a tax collection suit against a private person and
subpoenaed records held by the Collector of Internal Revenue. Upon the
Collector's refusal to produce certain files which had been declared confi-
dential by the Secretary of the Treasury, he was held in contempt. The
Treasury had promulgated a regulation under the authority of what is now
5 U.S.C. § 22 forbidding the disclosure of Internal Revenue documents.
The Supreme Court noted that the statute authorized the Secretary to
promulgate regulations "not inconsistent with law," and it concluded that
"There is certainly no statute which expressly or by implication for-
bade the adoption of such a regulation. This being the case, we do not
perceive upon what ground the regulation can be regarded as incon-
sistent with law.'"0 5
The Boske doctrine should be re-examined in the light of the changes
wrought by the discovery rules-which have the force of law. Their adop-
tion, therefore, has produced the inconsistency found to be lacking in the
Boske case. Rule 26 authorizes any party to
"take the testimony of any person . . . for the purpose of discovery
or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes."
No exemption from this rule is conferred upon the Government. Rule 26
likewise authorizes the use of subpoenas as provided in Rule 45. Sub-
paragraph B of that rule in turn authorizes a demand for the production of
documents. In consequence, an administrative regulation forbidding the
production of documents in response to a demand made under these rules
would be "inconsistent with law."
It has long been considered that all persons have a duty to produce rele-
vant evidence, upon the assumption that the interest of the public in seeing
that justice is done out-weighs the right to privacy." The Rules have
merely underscored that duty. Not infrequently a witness may be called
and questioned for weeks in a case which does not immediately touch his
interests. A corporation may be called upon to produce voluminous rec-
ords and files reaching back over the years at great expense and incon-
venience. The plea of administrative inconvenience to the Government
stands on no higher plane. The needs of justice out-weigh considerations
of convenienceY7
To be sure, some of the policy considerations existing where the Gov-
ernment is a litigant are inoperative in a private litigation. There is less
65. Id. at 469. See also Ex parte Sackett, 74 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1935). It may be
noted that the information sought in Boske v. Comingore had been reported under compul-
sion of law and was probably privileged.
66. 8 WiGoRE, EVIDENc E § 2192 (3d ed. 1940).
67. The information most frequently desired-tax returns and the like-is delivered
under compulsion of law and is privileged.
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danger of arbitrary suppression where the Government has no stake in the
outcome, and since it does not seek discovery, fair play does not demand
that it grant discovery. But the terms of the third party subpoena-
deposition provisions are unqualified, and no considerations of policy can
afford an exemption to the Government, though they might have some
bearing upon the measure of the asserted privilege.
CONCLUSION
At the base of the discovery procedure lies the conviction that pre-trial
knowledge of all the facts is essential to an enlightened judicial system.
Suppression of evidence has little to commend it on any theory, and it is
even less defensible when the Government litigates with its own citizens.
No exemption was conferred on the United States from the broad coverage
of the discovery provisions. The Rules thus follow our tradition that the
Government proceeds like any other litigant."
The claim of statutory immunity represents an attempt to amend the
Rules under the guise of interpretation. Historically, the claim of execu-
tive immunity founders upon the rulings of Chief Justice Marshall in the
Burr case. It harks back to a royal prerogative which found scant favor
on our soil and, even in the field of "sovereign immunity", is regarded with
increasing disfavor. In a State that rests on the consent of the governed,
the claim of the Government to greater privileges than are accorded its
citizens must rest not on administrative convenience, not on archaic no-
tions of prerogative alien to our institutions, but on genuine necessity.
Our nation has again and again risen above partisan strife because of gen-
eral confidence in the fairness of the Government. That confidence is in-'
dispensable to continuance of our democratic institutions. It can only be
impaired by governmental claims of special privilege against the citizenry.
68. See Bank Line v. United States, 163 F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1947).
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